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INTRODUCTION
The language of the United States Constitution has weathered
the centuries since its adoption in 1787,1 but the world around it has
changed, and continues to change, dramatically. Consequently, the
Supreme Court, as the official interpreter of constitutional law,2
must strive to develop workable frameworks and methodologies to
deal with contemporary issues.3 A brief study of Supreme Court
history shows that these frameworks and methodologies rarely
develop quickly and are often replete with uncertainty or am-
biguity.4 This is particularly evident regarding the ambiguous
relationship between the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and the
relatively new zoning and land use tool known as transferable
development rights (TDRs).5
TDRs are a “zoning technique used to permanently protect ...
natural and cultural resources by redirecting development that
would otherwise occur on these resource lands to areas planned to
accommodate growth and development.”6 In this context, “redirect-
ing” means restricting a landowner’s development rights on her own
property but allowing her to either sell or transfer those same rights
1. See Aziz Z. Huq, The Function of Article V, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1165, 1166-68 (2014).
2. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the
doctrine of judicial review).
3. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (adopting an undue burden test to evaluate abortion restrictions before viability).
4. For example, the Supreme Court spent approximately twenty years developing an
analytical test to evaluate the constitutionality of abortion restrictions. Compare Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973) (adopting a framework built around trimesters in 1973 to
evaluate abortion restrictions before viability), with Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (plurality opinion)
(rejecting the “rigid trimester framework of Roe v. Wade” and adopting an undue burden test
in 1992).
5. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 135-38 (1978) (holding
that the regulations imposed by New York City on Penn Central did not rise to the level of a
taking and declining to comment as to whether TDRs constitute just compensation); see also
Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 728-29 (1997) (declining to address
whether TDRs are directly relevant to the takings or just compensation analyses). Justice
Scalia’s concurrence in Suitum acknowledges the possibility of TDRs being relevant to the just
compensation analysis. Id. at 745-50 (Scalia, J., concurring). For further discussion of this
ambiguity, see infra Part V.
6. Transfer of Development Rights, CONSERVATIONTOOLS.ORG, http://conservationtools.
org/guides/12-transfer-of-development-rights [https://perma.cc/K6ZZ-FRM7].
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to another area where she, or another landowner or developer, may
use them.7 TDRs are essentially an intangible commodity created to
mitigate potential damages caused by protective zoning techniques.
Although the Court has had the opportunity to establish an
analytical test to clarify the relationship between such zoning
techniques, corresponding TDR programs, and the Takings Clause
on several occasions, the issue remains unsettled8 and has inspired
much debate.9
Fundamentally speaking, the Fifth Amendment guarantees
“private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”10 This language is applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment.11 Property rights, deeply rooted in
American law and tradition, are often characterized as a “bundle of
sticks”—meaning one may have various rights in relation to
property and each right individually is a “stick.”12 An important
“stick” is undoubtedly the right to develop one’s property.13 TDRs
are potentially subject to Fifth Amendment scrutiny because they
exist in circumstances where a government identifies a “public use”
for which it must limit a landowner’s ability to develop her
property.14 Some argue such regulatory limitation is effectively a
7. See infra Part I.A.
8. As of 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to settle the issue. See Suitum, 520 U.S. at 728-
29 (declining to define the relationship between TDRs and the Takings Clause or to create a
concrete framework to determine the constitutionality of TDRs).
9. Compare, e.g., Franklin G. Lee, Comment, Transferable Development Rights and the
Deprivation of All Economically Beneficial Use: Can TDRs Salvage Regulations that Would
Otherwise Constitute a Taking?, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 679, 707 (1998) (arguing TDRs are relevant
to the takings analysis and not to the just compensation analysis), with William Hadley
Littlewood, Comment, Transferable Development Rights, TRPA, and Takings: The Role of
TDRs in the Constitutional Takings Analysis, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 201, 229 (1998) (arguing
TDRs are relevant to the just compensation analysis and not to the takings analysis).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
12. See, e.g., ARTHUR C. NELSON ET AL., THE TDR HANDBOOK 3-4 (2012); Jerome G. Rose,
The Transfer of Development Rights: An Interim Review of an Evolving Concept, Introduction
to THE TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS: A NEW TECHNIQUE OF LAND USE REGULATION 3
(Jerome G. Rose ed., 1975); Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer et al., Transferable Development
Rights and Alternatives After Suitum, 30 URB. LAW. 441, 457 (1998) (citing MARTIN A. GARRET,
JR., LAND USE REGULATION: THE IMPACTS OF ALTERNATIVE LAND USE RIGHTS 76 (1987)).
13. See GEORGE H. NIESWAND ET AL., TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS: A
DEMONSTRATION 5 (1976).
14. See, e.g., John J. Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation
of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574, 578-79 (1972) (discussing the ideal way to
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taking of the landowner’s property for which TDRs are inadequate
compensation.15 This conclusion is somewhat hasty, however, con-
sidering the possible saving grace of the constitutional phrase
“public use.”
“Public use” in this context historically relates to preservation of
“such public goods as open space, agriculture and forestry[,] ...
historic sites or buildings, and affordable housing.”16 After identify-
ing a legitimate public interest for limiting a landowner’s develop-
ment rights,17 the government issues TDRs to the landowner in
order to mitigate actual or potential harms the restrictions cause.18
In theory, this is done by allowing the landowner to sell, or transfer,
her development rights rather than extinguishing them.19 Ulti-
mately, the goal of TDR programs is to keep development rights
intact by transferring them “from a site or area to be preserved to
an area targeted for development.”20 In effect, this is “a land use tool
that enables government to restrict development without actually
taking, and paying for, property.”21
Executed as detailed above, TDR programs seem to sidestep, or
even preempt, Takings Clause issues. Even so, such transactions
have given rise to the question of whether the use of TDRs in these
situations implicates constitutional concerns of taking property for
public use without just compensation.22 Furthermore, there is an
utter lack of consensus as to which side of the Takings Clause such
TDR programs are relevant. Some argue TDRs are more relevant to
preserve landmarks in urban settings as issuing TDRs to private landmark owners, which
they may sell to developers or utilize in an area designated for further development).
15. See R.S. Radford, Takings and Transferable Development Rights in the Supreme Court:
The Constitutional Status of TDRs in the Aftermath of Suitum, 28 STETSON L. REV. 685, 697
(1999).
16. NELSON ET AL., supra note 12, at xxiii.
17. See Sarah J. Stevenson, Note, Banking on TDRs: The Government’s Role as Banker
of Transferable Development Rights, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1329, 1368 (1998).
18. See NELSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 13.
19. See id. at 3.
20. Id. at xix.
21. Stevenson, supra note 17, at 1330; see also NELSON ET AL., supra note 12, at xix.
22. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 115-20 (1978)
(discussing the Fifth Amendment challenge that arose due to New York City’s designation of
Penn Central’s property as a landmark, thereby restricting the development rights in relation
to the landmark property).
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determining whether a taking has occurred at all,23 while others are
convinced TDRs are relevant only as to whether a government has
paid just compensation for a taking.24
The Supreme Court has declined to rule on this matter,25 leaving
this particular area of takings law in the relative darkness of doc-
trinal ambiguity. TDRs may not be constitutionally relevant to the
takings analysis at all,26 but the fair amount of litigation on this
matter suggests that it would be foolish for a government to imple-
ment TDR programs without giving constitutional concerns careful
and calculated consideration. Indeed, even if TDRs and correspond-
ing regulations do not amount to takings for which the government
must pay just compensation, considering common constitutional
concerns ex ante, at a minimum, serves as a governmental insur-
ance policy of sorts.
This Note concludes that TDRs are directly relevant to both sides
of the takings analysis due to their hybrid nature. Although the use
of TDRs has not been officially condoned or condemned by the
Supreme Court,27 there is a reason TDR programs have experienced
increasing success and adoption in the last forty to fifty years.28
Efficient TDR programs exploit the Court’s doctrinal ambiguity by
preventing regulation that would otherwise constitute a taking from
rising to that level, while simultaneously offering landowners just
compensation or something closely resembling just compensation.
This Note argues further that TDR banks—usually government-
sponsored tools designed to create trustworthy and sustainable
exchange forums for TDRs29—are essential to the continued
adoption and success of these programs. Such markets effectively
23. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 9, at 707.
24. See, e.g., Littlewood, supra note 9, at 229.
25. E.g., Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 728-29 (1997).
26. For a discussion of this concept, see infra Part I.B.
27. See Suitum, 520 U.S. at 728-29.
28. TDR programs were in their infancy in the early 1970s, see John J. Costonis,
Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75, 95 (1973), and were
adopted in fewer than forty communities by 1996, Lauren A. Beetle, Note, Are Transferable
Development Rights a Viable Solution to New Jersey’s Land Use Problems?: An Evaluation of
TDR Programs Within the Garden State, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 513, 524 (2003). However, a
thorough review identified 239 TDR programs in the United States in 2010. NELSON ET AL.,
supra note 12, at xxiv.
29. For a discussion on the concept and use of TDR banks, see infra Part III.
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ensure the equivalent of just compensation.30 TDR banks enable
TDR programs to cut through Fifth Amendment concerns, as
efficiently operated TDR programs remain under the Supreme
Court’s “radar.” Intuitively speaking, if landowners and developers
are satisfied with the ability to exchange development rights for a
fair price in a reliable market, they will not engage in lawsuits, and
no constitutional challenges will arise. This Note differs from
existing scholarship in that it does not propose a new framework of
laws, make suggestions as to the ideal judicial treatment of TDR
programs, or critique the Supreme Court for failing to address this
issue. Rather, this Note analyzes the law as it currently stands,
identifies why existing law is sufficient to resolve constitutional
concerns surrounding TDRs, and recommends how to effectively
exploit the existing doctrinal ambiguities.
Part I discusses a brief history of the TDR, including the circum-
stances giving rise to its creation, the basic mechanics, and the basis
of authority on which governments rely in implementing TDR
programs. Part II addresses common concerns related to TDR
programs in light of the Fifth Amendment. Part III discusses the
rise and use of TDR banks and their relation to resolving constitu-
tional concerns associated with TDR programs. Part IV provides a
snapshot of relevant legal tests currently recognized by the Supreme
Court to determine whether a taking has occurred, and if so, the
calculation of just compensation for that taking. Part V follows with
an analysis of the relationship of those recognized tests to TDRs.
Part V then highlights the ambiguity currently existing in this
Supreme Court doctrine, and it discusses the impact such ambiguity
has on the practical use of TDR programs. This Part argues that
when constitutional concerns arise, TDRs are directly relevant to
both sides of the takings analysis—takings and just compensation.
Part VI discusses the particular importance of the TDR banks to the
widespread viability of TDR programs.31 This Note identifies TDR
banks as the key to prolonged success of current and future TDR
30. See infra Part III.B.
31. For an in-depth discussion of the legal and financial issues TDR banks pose, and the
corresponding solutions, see, for example, Stevenson, supra note 17, at 1358-76. While such
a discussion is important, it is beyond the focus of this Note.
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programs, as they ensure the equivalent of just compensation to
landowners affected by preservation regulations.
I. THE TDR
A. A Brief History of the TDR and Basic Mechanics of a TDR
Program
The innovation of TDR programs in American land use law arose
largely in response to concerns that overdevelopment would result
in the loss of historic buildings, agricultural spaces, and other public
goods.32 Professor John J. Costonis even argued that “[u]rban
landmarks merit recognition as an imperiled species alongside the
ocelot and the snow leopard.”33 Costonis believed that if the trend of
unfettered development “[were] not reversed, the nation ... [would]
mourn the loss of an essential part of its architectural and cultural
heritage.”34 Many jurisdictions around the nation seem to have
agreed: by 1978, “all 50 States and over 500 municipalities [had]
enacted laws to encourage or require the preservation of buildings
and areas with historic or aesthetic importance.”35 Landmarks and
other public goods were in danger because it had often been more
profitable to redevelop property for business purposes than to
preserve such goods.36
The basic premise of a TDR program is to preserve public goods
by restricting development rights in designated preservation areas
and transferring those development rights to areas designated for
further development.37 These areas are referred to as “sending” and
“receiving” areas, or districts, respectively.38 The mechanics of a
32. See NELSON ET AL., supra note 12, at xix.
33. Costonis, supra note 14, at 574.
34. Id. at 575.
35. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 107 (1978).
36. See, e.g., Costonis, supra note 14, at 575 (“[L]andmark ownership in downtown areas
of high land value is markedly less profitable than redevelopment of landmark sites.”).
37. See Littlewood, supra note 9, at 209-10.
38. See Beetle, supra note 28, at 515-16 (“TDR works as a mechanism for preserving
certain parcels, designated as ‘sending areas,’ by transferring the right to develop that land
to other parcels located in ‘receiving areas.’”); Joseph D. Stinson, Comment, Transferring
Development Rights: Purpose, Problems, and Prospects in New York, 17 PACE L. REV. 319, 328
(1996) (“[TDRs] divert[ ] economic incentive away from critical areas through the use of
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TDR program consist of four basic phases. First, the government
must identify a landmark, or other public good, in need of regulatory
preservation.39 If the government found no public goods to be in
need of preservation, then the government would not create and
implement TDR programs.40 This concept is not inherently complex,
as the government must simply identify a notable public good
within its jurisdiction.41
Second, the government must adopt regulations restricting
development of the parcel identified in the first phase.42 This regu-
lation must specifically identify “sending areas” where development
is to be restricted, as well as designated “receiving areas” where the
restricted development rights may be transferred for full use.43
Failure to complete this phase subjects the regulations to constitu-
tional scrutiny. Granting a landowner the right to transfer her
restricted development rights to another area would be essentially
worthless if some sort of receiving area did not exist.44 In that case,
the landowner might have a colorable legal claim against the
government for subjecting her property to a taking without just
compensation.45 
The third phase follows the demands of the second: the gov-
ernment must issue a TDR—sometimes referred to as a TDR
‘sending’ and ‘receiving’ districts. The sending district is the area being protected. The
receiving district is the area that has been determined to be suitable for development.”
(footnotes omitted)).
39. See, e.g., Costonis, supra note 14, at 590 (noting that the first step of the Chicago
Plan—before landowners became entitled to the transfer of development rights—was the
designation of a parcel as a landmark).
40. For example, if New York City had never designated Grand Central Terminal as a
landmark, then the litigation in Penn Central would likely have never occurred, and Penn
Central Transportation Co. would have built the desired building above the Terminal. See
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 115-22.
41. See, e.g., id. at 115 (identifying Grand Central Terminal, which opened in New York
City in 1913, as “an ingenious engineering solution to the problems presented by urban
railroad stations, ... [and] a magnificent example of the French beaux-arts style”).
42. See id. at 110-11 (discussing the process by which New York City’s Landmarks
Preservation Commission identifies and regulates landmark sites). For a discussion on the
source of a government’s power to adopt these regulations, see infra Part I.B.
43. See NELSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 3; Beetle, supra note 28, at 515-16; Stinson,
supra note 38, at 328.
44. See Juergensmeyer et al., supra note 12, at 455 (“Without receiving zones, the TDRs
from the sending areas cannot be used, and with no use they will have no value.”).
45. For a discussion of the potential constitutional issues in relation to TDR programs,
see infra Part II.
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“credit”—to the landowner whose development rights the govern-
ment has restricted.46 The value of TDR credits varies depending on
the economy of the local jurisdiction.47 Some states and municipali-
ties have even adopted statutes requiring a minimum or maximum
value for TDR credits.48 The basic principle in issuing TDR credits
is to mitigate the landowner’s potential losses and inconveniences
by offering compensation to the extent that the regulation has
burdened the property.49
Finally, the government must remain dedicated to establishing
and maintaining a reliable market exchange for the TDRs.50 Though
there are many potential ways a government can accomplish this
goal,51 this Note focuses on arguably the most successful option: the
creation of a TDR bank.52 Failure to create a market landowners
and developers trust and are willing to utilize also potentially sub-
jects preservation regulations to constitutional scrutiny. Were a
government to restrict development rights and issue TDRs with
46. See, e.g., Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 729-32 (1997)
(discussing a regional TDR program in which Suitum was issued TDR credits proportionate
to the extent the preservation regulation restricted her development rights); NELSON ET AL.,
supra note 12, at 3 (“The severed right(s) are turned into a tradable commodity that can be
bought and sold—essentially, a development credit.”).
47. See Costonis, supra note 14, at 595. (“[T]he marketability of development rights ... [is]
governed ... by the general vigor of the construction and real estate markets in the particular
municipality’s central commercial and service areas.”); Note, The Unconstitutionality of
Transferable Development Rights, 84 YALE L.J. 1101, 1110 (1975) (“[T]he value of transferable
development rights will always be determined by and fluctuate with the market for these
rights.”).
48. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:18A-34(g), -39 (West 2015) (requiring a minimum value of
$10,000 for a TDR credit).
49. E.g., Suitum, 520 U.S. at 749-50 (Scalia, J., concurring); NELSON ET AL., supra note 12,
at 3 (illustrating this concept hypothetically by assigning “one [TDR] per 10 acres”); Costonis,
supra note 14, at 591.
50. See Keith Aoki et al., Trading Spaces: Measure 37, MacPherson v. Department of
Administrative Services, and Transferable Development Rights as a Path Out of Deadlock, 20
J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 273, 314 (2005) (“[T]he success of the TDR program depends on the trust
that both buyers and sellers have in the system.”).
51. See, e.g., Costonis, supra note 14, at 585-89 (discussing the New York Zoning
Resolution, which, as of 1972, allowed transfers of development rights only between adjacent
lots within the same designated district).
52. See Beetle, supra note 28, at 516. (“[M]ost successful TDR programs have established
[TDR] banks.)”; Stevenson, supra note 17, at 1331-32 (“[W]ithout a middleman to buy and
hold the TDRs, mutually beneficial transactions can take place only if a seller and a buyer are
simultaneously ready to sell and develop.... By acting as a middleman between buyer and
seller, TDR banks fill a critical timing gap that could be the downfall of a TDR program.”).
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essentially no value due to the lack of an established exchange
forum, the landowner would have a strong argument against the
government for effecting a taking of her property without providing
just compensation.53
Government entities that are mindful of completing each phase
of these basic mechanics can ensure the success and viability of TDR
programs within their respective jurisdictions.54 Adherence to these
basic mechanics protects a TDR program from constitutional
scrutiny.55
B. Basis of the Authority to Create TDR Programs
Although some commentators disagree as to the actual constitu-
tional basis for granting a government the authority to create TDR
programs, most agree that this power is derived from either eminent
domain or the states’ general police power.56 This analytical distinc-
tion is of pivotal importance because governmental use of eminent
domain requires the payment of just compensation,57 even though
this is not necessarily the case for use of its police power.58
53. See Dennis J. McEleney, Using Transferable Development Rights to Preserve
Vanishing Landscapes and Landmarks, 83 ILL. B.J. 634, 636 (1995) (“If the [buyers] decide
not to purchase any TDRs, the [sellers] are left holding worthless rights.”). For a discussion
of the potential constitutional issues in relation to TDR programs, see infra Part II.
54. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 17, at 1347-50 (discussing the success of the TDR
program in New Jersey’s Pinelands).
55. See generally id. (discussing the success of the New Jersey Pinelands TDR program,
which correctly and successfully executed each mechanical phase of its TDR program).
56. Compare, e.g., Note, The Unconstitutionality of Transferable Development Rights,
supra note 47, at 1107 (“[W]here TDR is employed, restrictions on the landmark owner’s right
to use his property normally will involve a taking for which compensation is required, rather
than a noncompensable regulation under the police power.”), with McEleney, supra note 53,
at 637 (“TDR programs are exercises of the police power under which the government regu-
lates the use and enjoyment of private property to protect the general public health, safety,
and welfare.”).
57. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (“When [diminution in property
value] reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of
eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.” (emphasis added)).
58. See id. (“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law. As long
recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police
power.” (emphasis added)).
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Eminent domain is the power to acquire private property for
public use.59 This power is typically used to acquire an individual’s
entire property, not just a portion of the property.60 In Kelo v. City
of New London, the Supreme Court defined “public purpose” very
“broadly, reflecting [a] longstanding policy of deference to legislative
judgments in this field.”61 The Court defers to legislative judgment
unless (1) the public purpose is illegitimate or (2) the means of
achieving a legitimate public purpose are irrational.62 Ultimately,
“[o]nce the question of the public purpose has been decided, the
amount and character of land to be taken ... rests in the discretion
of the legislative branch.”63
The police power, on the other hand, “extends ... to all the great
public needs,”64 which include “the public health, safety, morals,
and general welfare.”65 Regulations under the police power do not
condemn an individual’s entire property nor do they seize all her
corresponding rights for a public use.66 Rather, the police power
serves the general public welfare by restricting, where necessary,
only certain individual rights.67 As with eminent domain, courts
grant a substantial amount of deference to legislatures in
59. Note, The Police Power, Eminent Domain, and the Preservation of Historic Property,
63 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 724 (1963) (citing Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371-74 (1875)).
60. See, e.g., id. at 727 (“Although the fee [simple] is the interest usually acquired, the
power will also reach easements, leaseholds, options, contract rights, franchises, and riparian
rights.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).
61. 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005).
62. Id. at 488 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242-43 (1984)). For the
purpose of this Note, further clarification as to the meaning of “illegitimate” and “irrational”
is unnecessary.
63. Id. at 489 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35-36 (1954)).
64. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424 (1952) (citing Noble State Bank
v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911)).
65. Note, The Police Power, Eminent Domain, and the Preservation of Historic Property,
supra note 59, at 710 (footnotes omitted).
66. Lee, supra note 9, at 706 (“[R]easonable limitations on the pace of residential
development as part of, and reasonably related to, a comprehensive plan to protect an
environmentally sensitive public resource are well within the state’s police power.”). Note that
the police power in this instance was only limiting rights to residential development, not all
property rights. See id.
67. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 412 (1915) (“[T]here is no prohibition
of the removal of the brick clay; only a prohibition within the designated locality of its
manufacture into bricks.”). The Court in Hadacheck did not seize all the landowner’s rights
in relation to the property. Id. Rather, the Court disallowed the practice of making clay bricks
on the property as that activity created a nuisance for the surrounding landowners. Id.
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determining “what the public welfare demands.”68 Furthermore,
although the police power is still subject to judicial review, “the
presumption [is] in favor of a proper exercise of [the police] power.”69
A government entity may still, however, effect a taking for which
just compensation must be paid if the public need “is not sufficiently
public or the means unreasonable.”70 In fact, “[t]he general rule ...
is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”71 It is
unclear when a regulation goes “too far,” but this analysis is a
“question of degree—and therefore cannot be disposed of by general
propositions.”72 Rather, the “too far” analysis requires a fact-
intensive inquiry,73 and “[s]o long as the primary end sought is the
protection of the public from an evil and the means are reasonable,
a regulation will be constitutional even though the burden of
obedience is great.”74
Without delving further into the meat of these doctrines, it is
obvious they have certain similarities.75 The crucial difference
between eminent domain and the police power for purposes of TDR
programs, however, is that eminent domain typically involves
seizing all property rights for which just compensation must be
paid.76 Under the police power, it is possible to adopt regulations
restricting certain rights, while leaving the rest intact.77 Unless the
adopted regulations go “too far,” the government is not necessarily
required to pay just compensation.78
68. Note, The Police Power, Eminent Domain, and the Preservation of Historic Property,
supra note 59, at 710-11 (citing Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 685 (1888)).
69. Id. at 711 (citing Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425, 428 (1926)).
70. Id. at 711-12 (citing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922)).
71. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
72. Id. at 415-16.
73. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (indicating that
the “too far” test effectively becomes a multi-factor, fact-intensive inquiry); see also infra Part
IV.A.2.
74. Note, The Police Power, Eminent Domain, and the Preservation of Historic Property,
supra note 59, at 712.
75. Both, for example, concern promoting public needs and welfare. See supra notes 59,
64-65 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 57.
77. See supra note 66-67.
78. See supra note 58.
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Despite what some may argue, it is difficult to imagine a scenario
in which a state would use its eminent domain power to implement
a TDR program. Somehow, the government would have to seize all
of a landowner’s property rights and grant her TDR credits allocable
to a receiving zone.79 This does not resemble the vast majority of
TDR programs any local or state governments have implemented in
the last forty to fifty years.80 Furthermore, “[t]he high cost of land
acquisition ... makes governments reluctant to use eminent domain
to preserve landmarks and landscapes.”81
TDR programs are much more at home under the police power.
Under this approach, government entities are able to restrict a
landowner’s development rights while leaving other rights intact.82
In recent Supreme Court cases concerning TDRs, the Court has
declined to recognize a taking for which the government owes just
compensation.83 In fact, the Court arguably held that the regulatory
scheme by which TDRs are granted is a legitimate exercise of the
police power.84
This is not to say, however, that the Court could never determine
that a TDR program constituted a taking for which the government
must pay just compensation. Nor does this mean that the Court
would never find an overbearing and improperly implemented TDR
program to be a use of eminent domain, disguised as an exercise of
the police power, to avoid paying just compensation. Certainly the
79. One of the only cases that comes remotely close to this description is Fred F. French
Investing Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y. 1976). In that case, the city precluded
a landowner from developing land that used to be a park, instead requiring him to maintain
the land for public use. Id. at 383-84. The New York Court of Appeals held that this was an
illegitimate use of the police power because “it deprived the owner of ‘any reasonable
beneficial use of [his] property’ and destroyed all but a small residue of the property’s
economic value.” McEleney, supra note 53, at 638 (alterations in original) (quoting Fred F.
French Investing Co., 350 N.E.2d at 387). Even though the New York Court of Appeals found
this regulation illegitimate, it still does not look like eminent domain; rather, it seems like an
example of a regulation that went “too far.” See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922). It also looks more like a total regulatory taking. See infra Part IV.A.1.
80. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 17, at 1348 (“Landowners selling [TDRs] retain title
to the land and may continue using it for authorized, nonresidential purposes.”).
81. McEleney, supra note 53, at 634.
82. Property rights are inherently limited by the states’ policing power to some extent. See
Aoki et al., supra note 50, at 279 (discussing Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413).
83. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 728 (1997); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).
84. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 119-22.
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Court would have something to say about a government restricting
development rights without having any sort of public interest
justification for doing so. Rather, these Supreme Court cases
suggest that there may be constitutional concerns when a govern-
ment misuses its general police power in implementing TDR
programs. The police power is most clearly the source of a govern-
ment’s authority to create a TDR program. It is the misuse of this
power, then, which can give rise to constitutional concerns.
II. FIFTH AMENDMENT ISSUES WITH THE TDR
Despite the fact that the authority to implement TDR programs
has an evident basis in the police power,85 this relatively new land
use tool has given rise to constitutional concerns in relation to the
Takings Clause.86 Any government contemplating the use of a TDR
program, then, should act under the assumption that the shield of
the police power is not impenetrable. Proactively addressing these
concerns can ensure the constitutional exercise of the police power.
This Part highlights the primary concerns relating to governmental
takings and the consequent requirement of just compensation.
As previously discussed, the Fifth Amendment guarantees the
universal right that “private property [shall not] be taken for public
use, without just compensation.”87 Based on the “bundle of sticks”
theory, each landowner possesses a variety of rights in relation to
her property—among them the right to develop the property.88
Critics of TDR programs argue that restricting development rights
through preservation regulations effects a taking on that proper-
ty.89 This criticism is especially strong when the result of such
preservation regulations is to decrease the property’s economic
value or its potential for gainful use.90 Essentially, critics argue that
85. See supra Part I.B.
86. See, e.g., Note, The Unconstitutionality of Transferable Development Rights, supra note
47, at 1121-22 (arguing that “[a] constitutional attack on TDR will probably succeed,” and that
TDRs are “taking[s] for which just compensation is required”).
87. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
88. Littlewood, supra note 9, at 209; see also supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
89. E.g., Beetle, supra note 28, at 518; Note, The Unconstitutionality of Transferable
Development Rights, supra note 47, at 1107.
90. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 115-19 (1978)
(discussing the appellant’s argument that, because it had recently entered a contract “to
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the government uses preservation regulations to seize a landown-
er’s development rights.91 Consequently, where the government
adopts regulations to restrict development rights, some argue it
must pay just compensation.92
As many commentators agree, TDRs’ relationship to just com-
pensation is complicated given that “a TDR’s value is inherently
speculative.”93 The Supreme Court may have exacerbated this
concern by suggesting the possibility that TDRs may not be inde-
pendently sufficient to constitute “just compensation.”94 This is due
to the fluctuating value of, and the varying demand for, TDRs.95 For
example, suppose a city government restricts a landowner’s ability
to develop her empty lot downtown due to a public interest in
preserving open space from overdevelopment. What result if no
developers in the designated receiving area are interested in or
willing to buy those rights?96 Suppose the city allocates the TDRs to
the space above other nearby buildings whose owners are not
contemplating further development?97 And what choice does a
landowner have if a nearby developer decides to buy the TDRs, but
does so at a price substantially below market value simply because
the landowner has no other options? In these situations, are TDRs
really worth much of anything? TDR critics respond to this query
with a resounding “no.”98
increase its income,” restricting its ability to construct an office building above Grand Central
Terminal—which was part of the plan to increase its income—amounted to a taking without
just compensation). The appellant’s argument was essentially that the landmark preserva-
tion regulation seized property rights that would have increased the property’s economic value
and earning potential. See id.
91. See id.
92. E.g., Note, The Unconstitutionality of Transferable Development Rights, supra note
47, at 1121-22. For a discussion on the definition of just compensation and the corresponding
calculation methodology, see infra Part IV.B.
93. E.g., Littlewood, supra note 9, at 229.
94. “[T]hese [TDRs] may well not have constituted ‘just compensation’ if a ‘taking’ had
occurred.” Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 137 (emphasis added).
95. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., McEleney, supra note 53, at 636.
97. Cf. Costonis, supra note 14, at 587.
98. See, e.g., McEleney, supra note 53, at 636 (“If the [buyers] decide not to purchase any
TDRs, the [sellers] are left holding worthless rights.”); Stevenson, supra note 17, at 1359
(“Without a market, TDRs are worthless and will not be acceptable as compensation for
restricted property rights.”).
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To be sure, TDR programs can give rise to constitutional concerns
when implemented improperly. Though these concerns are based in
deeply rooted constitutional rights, they are certainly not insur-
mountable. Practically speaking, however, each government entity
must be prepared to defend its TDR programs in the event of a con-
stitutional challenge. Should a court find a taking, such a defense
will only be strengthened by demonstrating that the jurisdiction’s
TDRs have equal, or nearly equal, value to an approximation of
constitutional just compensation. Comprehending two fundamental
concepts remains essential to overcoming these constitutional
concerns: (1) how the use of TDR banks steers TDR programs away
from constitutional roadblocks,99 and (2) current relevant takings
law, as recognized by the Supreme Court,100 and its relation to
TDRs.101
III. TDR BANKS
The correct implementation of a government-run TDR bank
resolves most, if not all, constitutional concerns as to the legitimacy
of TDR programs. This Part addresses the concept and utility of the
TDR bank and identifies the constitutional concerns such banks
helps TDRs overcome.
A. What Is a TDR Bank?
Professor Costonis first conceptualized the idea of a TDR bank in
his renowned “Chicago Plan.”102 Under this plan, the TDR bank,
established and operated by the government, “[was] credited with
development rights that [had] been condemned from recalcitrant
owners, rights donated by owners of other landmarks, and rights
transferred from publicly owned landmarks.”103 After pooling TDRs
from various landowners into a TDR bank, the municipality was
then able to sell them to developers in designated receiving zones.104
99. See infra Part III.
100. See infra Part IV.
101. See infra Part V.
102. See Costonis, supra note 14, at 590-91.
103. Id. at 590.
104. Id. at 590-91.
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The Chicago Plan still provided the option for the private sale and
transfer of TDRs but offered the TDR bank as a method to “expedite
... development generally by easing the difficulties to land assem-
bly.”105 Modern iterations of the TDR bank follow the same for-
mat.106 Some say “[t]he cornerstone of a successful TDR program is
public confidence in the value [and transferability] of TDR cred-
its.”107 This Note contends that the cornerstone to successfully
securing this public confidence, and by extension the cornerstone to
a successful TDR program, is the proper implementation of a TDR
bank.108
B. Utility of TDR Banks and the Issues They Help Resolve
Although a TDR bank may take various forms,109 as a tool it
serves two basic functions: (1) as a middleman between buyers
and sellers, ensuring the existence of a reliable TDR market,110 and
(2) as a market regulator, ensuring equitable pricing for TDRs.111
These functions respond primarily to concerns of just compensation,
but TDR banks are relevant to the general Fifth Amendment an-
alysis, and they are crucial to the prolonged success and existence
of TDR programs.112
105. Id. at 591.
106. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 17, at 1347-50 (discussing how the New Jersey
legislature created a TDR bank to facilitate a market for the sale and transfer of TDRs in the
Pinelands).
107. Stinson, supra note 38, at 346.
108. See infra Part VI. Of course, there are some constitutional concerns regarding TDR
banks as well, but such an analysis is not the focus of this Note. For a detailed discussion of
common constitutional concerns regarding TDR banks, see generally Stevenson, supra note
17, at 1341-44, 1358-75.
109. Compare Norman Marcus, Air Rights in New York City: TDR, Zoning Lot Merger and
the Well-Considered Plan, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 867, 890-91 (1984) (discussing the TDR bank
used in New York’s South Street Seaport District as a “consortium of commercial banks”
rather than a government bank), with Stevenson, supra note 17, at 1351 (discussing the TDR
bank used in Seattle’s downtown TDR program as one authorized, created, and operated by
the government).
110. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 17, at 1337 (“Valuation and marketability remain the
two most significant obstacles facing TDR programs.”).
111. See, e.g., Beetle, supra note 28, at 523 (“TDR banks have been established to create
a market price for development credits so landowners can be assured their credits have value
and that they have realized the equity of their land.”).
112. For an in-depth discussion of how current takings law applies to TDRs and the role
TDR banks play in that analysis, see infra Parts V, VI.
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As previously discussed, without a reliable market in which land-
owners can sell and transfer TDRs, TDR credits are essentially
worthless.113 TDR banks resolve this concern by ensuring the cre-
ation and continued existence of a market where landowners may
either sell TDRs to developers or directly to the government,114
which will later sell the TDRs to developers as opportunities
arise.115 Due to its inherent versatility, the TDR bank can create the
type of market the circumstances require, offering assurance that,
even if a private transaction falls through the option to sell, the
TDR is not lost.116 Ideally, the ultimate purpose of the TDR bank is
to create a trustworthy market from which the government can
eventually remove itself.117
Part IV.B discusses current just compensation law, but the role
of TDR banks to just compensation is worth mentioning here.
Given that the police power grants authority to adopt the regula-
tions giving rise to the creation of TDR programs,118 governments
technically need not pay just compensation for restricting certain
development rights119—of course, that is unless those regulations go
“too far” so as to be “unreasonable” and leave the parcel without any
sort of economic benefit.120 The task, therefore, of the TDR bank is
not necessarily to secure “just compensation” in a constitutional
sense, but rather to secure something that looks and feels like just
compensation—a price that is market driven.121 Whether this be
113. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Costonis, supra note 14, at 590.
115. See, e.g., id. at 590-91.
116. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 17, at 1340.
117. Cf. id. at 1350 (discussing how the New Jersey legislature set an expiration for 2005
on its Pinelands TDR bank, at which point it would no longer be permitted to “buy, sell, and
guarantee [TDRs]”). This indicates that the New Jersey government expected the TDR bank
to develop a market that would eventually be able to sustain itself. See id.
118. See supra Part I.B.
119. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Fred F. French Investing
Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381, 383 (N.Y. 1976) (holding that a regulation restricting
a landowner’s property, to the extent that it had little reasonable use or economic value, was
a taking).
121. Cf. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 741-42 (1997) (discussing
“private market demand” but not just compensation); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 104 (1978) (“While these rights may well not have constituted ‘just
compensation’ if a ‘taking’ had occurred, the rights nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate what-
ever financial burdens the law has imposed on appellants and, for that reason, are to be taken
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adopting statutory requirements of minimum or maximum allow-
able prices for TDR credits,122 or paying close attention to the going
rate of TDRs in private transactions,123 TDR banks address valua-
tion concerns by mitigating potential or actual losses resulting from
the restriction of development rights.124
IV. A SNAPSHOT OF CURRENT TAKINGS LAW
A. Two Types of Relevant Takings
American takings law dates back to the teachings of Coke,
Blackstone, Locke, and other Enlightenment philosophers.125 Over
the centuries, the Supreme Court has distilled this doctrine down
to four analytical tests: (1) physical takings, (2) total regulatory
takings, (3) Penn Central takings (takings that go “too far”), and (4)
land use exaction takings.126 Although some may argue that these
tests are not incredibly helpful because the Court’s decisions are not
always entirely consistent,127 these tests provide the only legal
framework upon which governments can assess potential takings is-
sues with any sense of accuracy.128 Ultimately, the physical takings
and land use exactions tests are inapplicable to the constitutional
into account in considering the impact of regulation.”); Costonis, supra note 14, at 591 (“[T]he
Chicago Plan[, which is built on the use of a TDR bank,] is designed to compensate the
landmark owner for the actual losses that he suffers.”).
122. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:18A-34(g), -39 (West 2015).
123. See Beetle, supra note 28, at 547.
124. Cf., e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 137 (discussing TDRs but the logic extends easily
to TDR banks); Stinson, supra note 38, at 356 (discussing the possible formation of a
corporation to sell TDRs from sending districts as a way to mitigate inequity).
125. Edward J. Sullivan, A Brief History of the Takings Clause, WASH. U. ST. LOUIS:
LAND USE L., http://landuselaw.wustl.edu/articles/brief_hx_taking.htm [https://perma.cc/
W2G7-5QWP].
126. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005).
127. See, e.g., Rachel A. Rubin, Note, Taking the Courts: A Brief History of Takings
Jurisprudence and the Relationship Between State, Federal, and the United States Supreme
Courts, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 897, 897-98 (2008) (discussing the criticism that “takings
law today is ... a confused muddle, intractable, [and] an ambiguous area in which the United
States Supreme Court complicates its own jurisprudence with each new decision” (footnotes
omitted)).
128. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548 (holding that “a plaintiff seeking to challenge a govern-
ment regulation as an uncompensated taking of private property” only has four recognized
options).
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analysis of TDRs.129 As discussed in more detail below, the total
regulatory takings and Penn Central takings analyses bear more
relevance to TDRs in this analytical context.130 The following Part
briefly outlines these two tests to provide context for a more
complete analysis of their relation to TDR programs.
1. Total Regulatory Takings
The Supreme Court has held that “when the owner of real prop-
erty has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial
uses in the name of the common good, ... he has suffered a
taking.”131 In Lucas, the plaintiff purchased two residential lots to
construct single-family homes.132 However, two years after the
purchase South Carolina passed a law “which had the direct effect
of barring [Lucas] from erecting any permanent habitable structures
on his two parcels.”133 On remand from the Supreme Court, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina held that “Lucas ha[d] suffered a
temporary taking deserving of compensation.”134
Central to this test is that a government regulation must deprive
the landowner’s property of all economically beneficial use,135 be-
cause a state “may, consistent with the Takings Clause, affect
property values by regulation without incurring an obligation to
compensate” through use of the state’s police power.136 A total
129. The physical takings and land use exaction analyses are inapplicable here as the
takings TDRs are designed to compensate do not correspond to those tests. Cf., e.g., Nollan
v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 827, 841-42 (1987) (finding a taking where the
California Coastal Commission conditioned permission to rebuild plaintiffs’ house on the
“transfer to the public of an easement across [plaintiffs’] beachfront property” because the
condition failed to further the end advanced as its justification); Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982) (finding a physical taking where defendant
had installed physical cables on plaintiff ’s building).
130. See infra Part V.A.
131. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
132. Id. at 1006-07.
133. Id. at 1007.
134. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992). The Supreme Court
of South Carolina found a “temporary taking” because it ordered that Lucas be given a spe-
cial permit for future construction. Id.
135. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
136. Id. at 1022-23. For a discussion of the definition of the police power, see supra Part
I.B.
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regulatory taking, then, occurs only when such regulations leave a
landowner’s property “economically idle.”137
2. Penn Central Takings: Regulations That Go “Too Far”
The Penn Central analysis traverses a multi-factor, fact-intensive
inquiry.138 These factors include “[t]he economic impact of the regu-
lation on the claimant[,] ... the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations[,] ... [and]
the character of the governmental action.”139 To date, the Supreme
Court has been unable to develop any set formula for determining
which factors carry the most weight.140 Consequently, it is unclear
at which point the scale tips in favor of, or against, finding a
taking.141 Ultimately, “[t]he balance of these factors rests in judicial
discretion.”142 This multi-factor test is built on the foundation of the
Supreme Court’s “too far” test in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.143
The Court now applies the Penn Central factors to determine
whether a regulation goes “too far.”144
B. Just Compensation
The Supreme Court has defined “just compensation” as “fair
market value.”145 The Court has further defined “fair market value”
as “what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller.”146
The dilemma here is how to determine the formula for calculating
fair market value. Some argue this should be a subjective standard,
taking into consideration personal and intrinsic valuations of
property, while others argue an objective standard would be more
137. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
138. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
139. Id. at 124.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. Rubin, supra note 127, at 908.
143. Juergensmeyer et al., supra note 12, at 459-60.
144. See id.
145. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 25 (1984). The Court also uses the
phrase “market value,” but the meaning is the same. See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S.
369, 374 (1943) (using the phrase “market value” instead of “fair market value”).
146. Miller, 317 U.S. at 374.
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appropriate.147 The Supreme Court undoubtedly agrees with the
latter, as subjective factors tend to overcomplicate the calcula-
tions.148 Although a subjective calculation may appeal more to
individuals with increased levels of emotional attachment to their
property, in the interest of establishing an administrable test, the
focus must remain on objective valuation factors.149 Consequently,
market factors such as supply, demand, and the state of local
economies objectively determine the amount constituting just
compensation.
V. TAKINGS LAW APPLIED TO TDRS
A. The Two Relevant Tests’ Relation to TDRs
As previously established, not all takings doctrines are applica-
ble in the context of TDRs.150 Neither the physical takings nor land
use exaction analyses are helpful here.151 The total regulatory tak-
ings and Penn Central takings tests, however, bear some relevance.
The Supreme Court has struggled to delineate its takings doc-
trines.152 This is particularly true when distinguishing between a
total regulatory taking and a Penn Central taking, as one might
argue that a total regulatory taking is simply a regulation that has
147. Compare, e.g., Richard Craswell, Instrumental Theories of Compensation: A Survey,
40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1135, 1149 (2003) (discussing proposals that compensation be set “at
a level that would make [takees] subjectively indifferent to whether the [taking] took place
or not”), with Katrina Miriam Wyman, The Measure of Just Compensation, 41 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 239, 244 (2007) (arguing that “takings compensation should aim to leave takees
objectively, rather than subjectively, indifferent to takings”).
148. See, e.g., 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. at 35-36 (holding that “subjective elements ...
would enhance the risk of error and prejudice,” and that such elements would create “sophis-
tical and abstruse formulas ... that are too elusive” for juries (footnotes omitted) (quoting
Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5, 20 (1949))).
149. See id.
150. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 127, at 897. (“Regulatory takings law today is criticized
as a confused muddle, intractable, as an ambiguous area in which the United States Supreme
Court complicates its own jurisprudence with each new decision, and as an area in which the
Court fails to ‘revisit its regulatory takings precedent in order to clarify the current
standard.’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Keri Ann Kilcommons, Note, A Survey of Supreme
Court Takings Jurisprudence: The Impact of Del Monte Dunes on Nollan, Dolan, Agins, and
Lucas, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 532, 533 (2001))).
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gone “too far” under the Penn Central analysis.153 For this reason,
the analysis under both approaches may seem quite similar, but
they differ in the degree of the landowner’s harm. Under a total
regulatory taking, the regulation will have “destroy[ed] all but a
bare residue of its economic value.”154 The multi-factor analysis
under Penn Central, however, will amount to something less, though
the Court has not identified exactly what this might be.155 Fred F.
French Investing Co. v. City of New York and Penn Central are
useful in illustrating the relationship between these takings tests
and TDR programs.
In Fred F. French Investing Co., the City of New York precluded
a landowner from developing land previously used as a park, re-
quiring him instead to maintain the land for public use.156 In an
effort to mitigate the harms and losses resulting from this restric-
tion, the city granted the landowner TDRs “usable elsewhere.”157
Despite the existence of a TDR program,158 the Court of Appeals of
New York held that the restriction “render[ed] the property unsuit-
able for any reasonable income productive or other private use for
which it [was] adapted and thus destroy[ed] its economic value.”159
This case proves the mere existence of a TDR program alone is
insufficient to avoid successful constitutional challenges.160 If a court
considers preservation regulations an extreme deprivation, perhaps
they are unsalvageable by a TDR program.161 Of course, this would
depend on the structure and efficiency of the TDR program.162
153. Compare supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing total regulatory takings), with supra Part
IV.A.2 (discussing Penn Central takings).
154. Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381, 383 (N.Y. 1976).
155. The Supreme Court “has been unable to develop any ‘set formula’ for determining
when ‘justice and fairness’ require that economic injuries caused by public action be
compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few
persons.” Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
156. Fred F. French Investing Co., 350 N.E.2d at 383-84.
157. Id. at 382.
158. It may not have been a good one, however. In fact, Professor Costonis was highly
critical of this breed of TDR program. Costonis, supra note 14, at 586-89. Professor Costonis
drafted his Chicago Plan to remedy the problems with this New York program. Id. at 589-91.
159. Fred F. French Investing Co., 350 N.E.2d at 387.
160. See id. at 387-88.
161. Cf. id.
162. The TDRs, in this case,
were ... made transferable to another section of mid-Manhattan in the city, but
not to any particular parcel or place. There was thus created floating develop-
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Perhaps the court would not have found a total regulatory taking
here had the TDRs been readily sellable or transferable.163 Although
the Supreme Court did not decide this case, it is indicative of how
the Court might deal with a total regulatory taking case involving
a TDR program.
As discussed in Part IV, TDR programs can certainly be relevant
to the Penn Central multi-factor takings analysis as well. In Penn
Central, New York City designated Penn Central’s Grand Central
Terminal as a landmark.164 This hindered Penn Central’s plan to
build an office building above the Terminal.165 Although Penn Cent-
ral would still be able to operate the Terminal at a profit, the city
also issued TDR credits to mitigate possible losses.166 Even though
the Court did not find a taking in this case, it did consider New
York’s TDR program to some extent.167 Consequently, TDRs are
relevant in some way to the takings analysis in the context of total
regulatory and Penn Central takings, but the Court has declined to
definitively clarify this relationship.168
B. Ambiguity in the Supreme Court
Despite having multiple opportunities to definitively rule TDR
programs as unconstitutional or constitutional, the Supreme Court
has declined to do so.169 This would not be so problematic had
the Court never entertained a case concerning TDR programs, but
as the case law now stands, the Court has left many questions
unanswered. For example, do TDRs belong to the takings or just
compensation side of the Fifth Amendment analysis? To the extent
ment rights, utterly unusable until they could be attached to some accommodat-
ing real property, available by happenstance of prior ownership, or by grant,
purchase, or devise, and subject to the contingent approvals of administrative
agencies.
Id.
163. See id.
164. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1978).
165. Id. at 116.
166. Id. at 136-37.
167. Id. at 137-38.
168. See id.
169. See, e.g., Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 728 (1997); Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 137-38.
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TDRs are subject to the Takings Clause at all, this Note argues the
answer to this question is that TDRs belong to both.170 The result is
an ambiguous relationship between TDR programs and the Takings
Clause.171 The following discussion addresses the Supreme Court’s
approach to this analysis—in relation to takings and just compen-
sation—as it currently stands, and not how it ideally should be.
To be fair, it is understandable why the Court and many legal
commentators disagree due to the hybrid character of TDRs.172
Depending on the eye of the beholder, a TDR may seem more like a
use of a property right,173 or it may seem more like a form of
compensation.174 Once again, as this Note focuses primarily on what
the current case law holds, the Justices’ most recent arguments in
Penn Central and Suitum are the primary sources of analysis.
Portions of the Justices’ arguments are, of course, dicta, but they are
informative, nonetheless.175
As established above, in Penn Central the Court did not find a
taking for which New York must pay just compensation.176 The
majority opinion stated that “the New York City law ... permit[ted]
Penn Central not only to profit from the Terminal but also to obtain
a ‘reasonable return’ on its investment.”177 Furthermore, the Court
found that Penn Central “exaggerate[d] the effect of the law on their
ability to make use of the air rights above the Terminal.”178 The
restriction did not prohibit Penn Central from “occupying any
portion of the airspace above the Terminal,” and “it [was] not
literally accurate to say that they ha[d] been denied all use of even
those pre-existing air rights.”179 The Court seems to have treated
170. See infra Part V.C.
171. See infra Part V.C.
172. “[T]he pleadings raise issues about the significance of the TDR’s [sic] both to the claim
that a taking has occurred and to the constitutional requirement of just compensation.”
Suitum, 520 U.S. at 728; see also, e.g., supra note 9.
173. E.g., Lee, supra note 9, at 701-02.
174. E.g., Littlewood, supra note 9, at 231-32.
175. Although dicta may not be controlling precedent, it is insightful as to how the Court
may rule in the future. See Foster Calhoun Johnson, Judicial Magic: The Use of Dicta as
Equitable Remedy, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 883, 897 n.78 (2012) (explaining that legal scholars view
dicta as a predictive guide to courts and litigators regarding future rulings in similar cases).
176. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).
177. Id. at 136.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 136-37.
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TDRs as a legitimate and vested property right, relevant in
determining whether a taking had occurred: “While these [TDRs]
may well not have constituted ‘just compensation’ if a ‘taking’ had
occurred, the rights nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate whatever
financial burdens the law has imposed on appellants and ... are to
be taken into account in considering the impact of regulation.”180
Justice Rehnquist disagreed, arguing that a taking had occurred,
and that the Court should have remanded to determine whether the
TDRs’ value equated to just compensation.181
When presented with the opportunity to reevaluate the constitu-
tionality of TDRs in Suitum, the Court declined to comment.182 In
fact, the only mention of TDRs’ relevancy to the Takings Clause was
in Justice Scalia’s concurrence.183 Adopting Justice Rehnquist’s
view, Justice Scalia argued that “[p]utting TDRs on the taking
rather than the just-compensation side of the equation ... is a clever,
albeit transparent, device that seeks to take advantage of ... our
Takings-Clause jurisprudence.”184 Justice Scalia’s main concern was
that applying TDRs only to the takings side of the analysis would
allow the government to effect a taking and “get away with paying
much less.”185 While it might be easy to say Justice Rehnquist’s and
Justice Scalia’s opinions are irrelevant because they were in the
minority, it is important to remember that their opinions may one
day become, at least in part, the majority view.186 Furthermore,
because neither the majority in Penn Central nor the majority in
Suitum explicitly stated that TDRs are relevant in determining
whether a taking has occurred in the first place, one cannot rest so
180. See id. at 137 (emphasis added) (citing Goldbatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,
594 (1962)).
181. Id. at 143, 152 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
182. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 728 (1997).
183. See generally id. at 745-50 (Scalia, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 747-48.
185. Id. at 748.
186. As Justice Ginsburg wrote: 
On occasion—not more than four times per term I would estimate—a dissent
will be so persuasive that it attracts the votes necessary to become the opinion
of the Court. I had the heady experience once of writing a dissent for myself and
just one other Justice; in time, it became the opinion of the Court from which
only three of my colleagues dissented.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Lecture, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2010).
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assured that this is settled law either.187 Rather, the result is this
ambiguous reality: TDRs may be relevant to finding a taking, the
calculation of just compensation, or both.188 The “clearest” way
through this conundrum is to take advantage of TDRs’ hybrid
nature and to exploit the Court’s ambiguity. That is, take the
arguments and concerns from both the majority and the minority
opinions in Penn Central and Suitum to create a “hybrid test” for a
hybrid tool.189
C. Exploiting the Ambiguity
Perhaps the most challenging question here is why the Supreme
Court has yet to offer clarity to the constitutionality of TDR pro-
grams. The Court’s critics may argue that the Justices are just being
inattentive and are failing to fulfill their duties.190 That proposition
seems more like a convenient argument to avoid confronting
reality.191 It seems much more consistent with reality that the Court
repeatedly approaches this issue with an “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix
it” mentality. If TDR programs efficiently and effectively solve
zoning and land use problems when implemented correctly, then it
logically follows that there is no need to issue an official opinion.
Furthermore, if the Court’s “muddled” holdings in general takings
law are any indication, perhaps legal practitioners and scholars
should not want a “clarifying” opinion on this matter.192
It is important to avoid conflating this concept with justiciability
doctrines such as “ripeness” and “standing.” The “ripeness” doctrine
187. See supra Part V.A.
188. See Suitum, 520 U.S. at 745-50 (Scalia, J., concurring); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978); id. at 141-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
189. Professor Malone briefly hinted at this possibility in 1984. Linda A. Malone, The
Future of Transferable Development Rights in the Supreme Court, 73 KY. L.J. 759, 790 (1984).
190. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Clarence Thomas, a Supreme Court Justice of Few Words,
Some Not His Own, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/28/us/
justice-clarence-thomas-rulings-studies.html [https://perma.cc/8AVD-UY8B].
191. Cf. Tamara Tabo, A Supreme Court Justice Who Does His Job Well, But Bores The New
York Times While Doing It, ABOVE LAW (Aug. 31, 2015, 10:47 AM), http://abovethelaw.
com/2015/08/a-supreme-court-justice-who-does-his-job-well-but-bores-the-new-york-times-
while-doing-it/ [https://perma.cc/M26T-FKWW] (criticizing Liptak for “lack[ing] substance,
offering up only arguments, half-arguments, and snark masquerading as arguments to the
extent necessary to help his readers feel justified in patting themselves on their backs”).
192. See supra notes 127, 152 and accompanying text.
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aims at “separat[ing] matters that are premature for review, be-
cause the injury is speculative and never may occur, from those
cases that are appropriate for federal court action.”193 In the context
of regulatory takings—and, by extension, TDRs—a landowner’s
claim is ripe from the moment the government adopts the regula-
tions.194 Importantly, however, this is an “uphill battle”195 because
“it is difficult to demonstrate that ‘mere enactment’ of a piece of
legislation ‘deprived [the owner] of economically viable use of [his]
property.’”196 Nonetheless, by adopting regulations restricting de-
velopment rights and corresponding TDR programs, any affected
landowners’ claims are ripe for judicial review.197
“Standing,” easily confused with “ripeness” at times,198 requires
“that a plaintiff allege (1) an injury that is (2) ‘fairly traceable to the
defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct’ and that is (3) ‘likely to be
redressed by the requested relief.’”199 A landowner whose develop-
ment rights the government restricted has certainly suffered an
injury.200 That injury is traceable to the government, as the
government adopted the regulation causing the restriction in the
first place.201 Finally, a favorable ruling would undoubtedly redress
the injury, as the landowner would be able to utilize her develop-
ment rights as originally planned.202 Clearly, landowners whose
property is subject to preservation regulations have standing,
otherwise Penn Central, Suitum, and any other cases concerning
TDRs never would have reached litigation.
There must be an alternative explanation, then, as to why the
Supreme Court has refused to clarify this ambiguity. Absent a
ruling to the contrary, the logical conclusion is that current law
193. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 107-08 (5th ed.
2015) (citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967)).
194. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 736 n.10 (1997) (citing
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987)).
195. Id. (quoting DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 495).
196. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n,
452 U.S. 264, 297 (1981)).
197. See id.
198. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 193, at 107-09.
199. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 590 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
200. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 115-17 (1978).
201. See, e.g., id.
202. See, e.g., id.
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already addresses this issue to a satisfactory extent, and there is no
need for further clarification.203 The fact that there is compelling
evidence that Congress endorses the TDR as a viable land use tool
is conducive to this conclusion.204
As previously established, preservation regulations and TDR
programs are legitimately adoptable and enforceable under the
police power.205 Furthermore, the government need not necessarily
satisfy the constitutional requirement for just compensation when
utilizing that police power.206 It follows, then, that a TDR program,
implemented legitimately under the police power, does not inher-
ently rise to the level of a taking,207 nor is just compensation a
required operational cost.208 Practically speaking, however, a gov-
ernment would be setting itself up for endless litigation were it to
arbitrarily and capriciously restrict development rights without
doing enough, or anything at all, to mitigate landowners’ potential
losses.209 Therefore, any government entity implementing preser-
vation regulations and a corresponding TDR program must operate
with the mindset that it is effecting a “taking,” even though this
may not necessarily be the case.210 By doing so, efficiently operated
TDR programs will prevent regulations from rising to the level of
total regulatory takings,211 and will “tip the scales” of the Penn
203. Cf. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 728 (1997) (“While the
pleadings raise issues about the significance of the TDR’s both to the claim that a taking has
occurred and to the constitutional requirement of just compensation, we have no occasion to
decide, and we do not decide, whether or not these TDR’s may be considered in deciding the
issue whether there has been a taking in this case, as opposed to the issue whether just
compensation has been afforded for such a taking.” (emphasis added)).
204. See Stevenson, supra note 17, at 1347-48 (noting that Congress declared the New
Jersey Pinelands a national interest, giving New Jersey detailed instructions regarding
preservation, including the establishment of a TDR bank).
205. See supra Part I.B.
206. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
209. This would yield results similar to those in Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New
York. See generally 350 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y. 1976).
210. The phrase “operate with the mindset” is meant to communicate the idea that the
government must essentially “pretend” (though it is certainly not make believe) that its
actions are the equivalent of takings. With this mindset, the government will be more aware
of constitutional concerns of what constitutes a taking, and, consequently, will be more
mindful of seeking something that resembles just compensation.
211. See generally Lee, supra note 9 (discussing how TDRs salvage regulations that would
otherwise constitute takings).
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Central multi-factor test in favor of finding that no taking has
occurred.212 Simultaneously, properly implemented TDR programs
will offer a market-driven substitute for just compensation, thereby
avoiding further constitutional scrutiny.213 Crucial to ensuring this
market-driven alternative is the creation and proper maintenance
of a TDR bank.214
VI. HOW TO KEEP THE MAGIC ROLLING: TDR BANKS
TDR banks are vital to the continued adoption and longevity of
TDR programs.215 Given recent scrutiny in Suitum, it is quite
possible that if another case questioning TDRs’ constitutionality
rose to Supreme Court review, TDR programs would be subject to
increased scrutiny as to whether they constitute just compensation
for a taking.216 In light of this possibility, the best chance of TDR
programs surviving a barrage of constitutional challenges is to
ensure TDRs have a value that bears close resemblance to just
compensation.217 TDR banks, when used properly, accomplish this
task.218
Intuitively speaking, a landowner will only bring suit against the
government when she feels as though the government has unjustly
infringed upon her rights.219 Following this common-sense logic, if
the government prevents the landowner from feeling abused, she
will not file a complaint.220 In order to prevent those feelings, the
212. See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-38 (1978)
(discussing a TDR program that survived the multi-factor analysis).
213. See Aoki et al., supra note 50, at 315.
214. Cf. id. at 316 (“TDR banks are the most obvious way to provide the logistical and price
support required to guarantee value.”).
215. See Beetle, supra note 28, at 516-17 (“[M]ost successful TDR programs have estab-
lished [TDR] banks.”).
216. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 745-50 (1997) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); see also supra note 186 and accompanying text.
217. This is due to the fact that the most significant problem TDR programs face is
valuation and marketability, which are both problems TDR banks directly address and
resolve. See Stevenson, supra note 17, at 1330, 1341-44.
218. See Aoki et al., supra note 50, at 315.
219. Cf. Note, The Unconstitutionality of Transferable Development Rights, supra note 47,
at 1121 (“TDR is likely to be challenged by landmark owners unless the market for devel-
opment rights accurately reflects the value of their condemned development potential.”
(emphasis added)).
220. See id.
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government must gain the landowner’s trust.221 The TDR bank
gains the landowner’s trust by establishing a reliable market, en-
suring equitable pricing, and by resolving the would-be crippling
timing issue of not being able to find a buyer for her TDRs.222
Ultimately, TDR banks ensure that efficiently run TDR programs
stay under the radar of the Supreme Court’s judicial purview. This
is likely a primary reason why there have been so few cases at the
Supreme Court level in the first place. The TDR bank encapsulates
a TDR program, aiding it to cut straight through the Fifth Amend-
ment takings analysis without hitting any substantial roadblocks
or obstacles.
Consider, by analogy, Odysseus’s feat of firing an arrow through
twelve axe handles.223 In order to accomplish this task, Odysseus
needed a proper bow and arrow.224 Furthermore, the arrow must
have had a straight shaft, a sharpened point, and perfectly placed
feathers to guide the arrow.225 In this matter, the police power is the
bow, the preservation regulation is the shaft, the TDR credit is
the arrow’s point, and the TDR bank is the arrow’s feathers. The
axes are, of course, the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. When a
government entity adopts legitimate preservation regulations under
the police power, it may then adopt a TDR program, or fire the
arrow. The TDR credits are the arrow’s point in that they fine-tune
the preservation regulations so as to pass swiftly through the axe
handles.226
Imagine the result had Odysseus fired an arrow with no feathers.
Undoubtedly, it would have fallen short of its target. Although it is
highly unlikely, perhaps there is a slight possibility that the arrow
would pass all the way through.227 Similarly, without a TDR bank,
it is possible a TDR program will succeed to some degree and avoid
221. Stinson, supra note 38, at 346-47.
222. See Stevenson, supra note 17, at 1341-44.
223. HOMER, ODYSSEY 315-41 (A.T. Murray trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2004).
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. TDR credits effectively mitigate the impact of the preservation regulations. Penn.
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978) (“[TDRs] undoubtedly mitigate
whatever financial burdens the law has imposed ... and, for that reason, are to be taken into
account in considering the impact of regulation.” (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590, 594 (1962))).
227. This, however, did not happen. HOMER, supra note 223, at 321-41.
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constitutional invalidation.228 However, with a TDR bank in place
TDR programs have an exponentially higher chance of surviving
Fifth Amendment scrutiny unscathed.229 This is true especially in
today’s political climate, in which there seems to be increased
criticism and distrust of governmental action, particularly where
personal rights are at stake.230 In order to survive constitutional
scrutiny under the Takings Clause, each jurisdiction currently
using, or planning to use, a TDR program should also implement a
TDR bank.231
CONCLUSION
Over the past fifty years, TDR programs have become one of the
most efficient land use tools.232 Through proper implementation and
operation of these programs, state and local governments can pre-
serve public goods—landmarks, open space, low-income housing,
etc.—while maximizing the efficiency and concentration of develop-
ment potential.233 Critical to the continued adoption and prolonged
success of these programs, however, is careful and calculated avoid-
ance of potential constitutional issues, for “[g]overnment hardly
could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not
be diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied
limitation and must yield to the police power.”234 If governments do
228. See, e.g., Costonis, supra note 14, at 585-89 (describing the relative success of a former
TDR program in New York that did not make use of a TDR bank, and that program’s
corresponding issues).
229. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text; cf., e.g., Beetle, supra note 28, at 516-
17 (“[M]ost successful TDR programs have established [TDR] banks.”).
230. See, e.g., Marc Hetherington & Thomas Rudolph, Why Don’t Americans Trust the
Government? Because the Other Party Is in Power, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2014), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/30/why-dont-americans-trust-the-
government-because-the-other-party-is-in-power/ [https://perma.cc/G7E2-R6TN].
231. There are some common legal and financial concerns relating to TDR banks, but they
are easily surmountable. For a detailed discussion of these common concerns, see Stevenson,
supra note 17, at 1358-75.
232. See, e.g., Juergensmeyer et al., supra note 12, at 444; Beetle, supra note 28, at 558.
233. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 17, at 1344-47 (discussing the success of New York’s
TDR program in the South Street Seaport Historic District in “preserv[ing] several blocks of
small, two-hundred-year-old buildings”).
234. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
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not construct TDR programs correctly, they may begin to rise to the
level of a taking for which just compensation must be paid.235 In that
case, it is unlikely many governments would be able to fund just
compensation for each “taking” resulting from preservation regula-
tions.236
Although the Supreme Court has yet to rule a TDR program
unconstitutional as a taking without just compensation, it only
takes one bad apple to spoil the bunch.237 To avoid these constitu-
tional issues, it is essential for each jurisdiction currently utilizing
or considering the implementation of a TDR program to operate
under the assumption that TDRs are relevant to both the initial
takings and just compensation analyses.238 Critical to ensuring the
equivalent of just compensation is the authorization and efficient
operation of a TDR bank.239
As previously discussed, TDR banks resolve most, if not all,
constitutional concerns and keep TDR programs “flying under the
radar” of the Supreme Court’s judicial purview.240 TDR banks create
a stable and reliable market in which landowners and developers
can sell, transfer, and buy TDRs.241 Furthermore, if implemented
correctly, TDR banks help establish a market-driven price for TDRs,
which is encouraging to skeptical potential market participants.242
The ambiguity in the Supreme Court’s doctrine relating to the
constitutionality of TDRs and TDR programs is by no means a death
sentence. To the contrary, proactive government entities can use
this ambiguity to their advantage in ensuring the continued use
and adoption of this useful land use tool. The TDR has proven to be
235. Cf. id. (explaining that government power must have its limits).
236. See id.
237. Supreme Court rulings, when interpreting matters of constitutional law, have prec-
edential and controlling effect on all other courts in the United States. See Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803) (establishing the doctrine of judicial review).
One Supreme Court ruling against the legitimacy of TDR programs could potentially do away
with TDRs altogether, unless overturned by the Court at a later date. Cf., e.g., Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (overturning the “rigid trimester
framework of Roe v. Wade” and adopting an undue burden test in determining the con-
stitutionality of abortions).
238. See supra Part V.C.
239. See supra Part VI.
240. See supra Parts III and VI.
241. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
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an incredibly efficient tool—one that allows for simultaneous
preservation of public goods and advancement of development
interests. Crucial to the continued success of TDR programs is an
efficiently operated TDR bank. In order to exploit the Supreme
Court’s doctrinal ambiguity and insulate TDRs from further
constitutional skepticism, governments should include TDR banks
in the fundamental blueprints of each TDR program.
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